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Are	all	primitives	created	equal?	
JTM	Miller	
Forthcoming	in	The	Southern	Journal	of	Philosophy	
Pre-proof	version	Abstract:	 Primitives	are	both	important	and	unavoidable,	and	which	set	of	primitives	we	endorse	will	 greatly	 shape	 our	 theories	 and	 how	 those	 theories	 provide	 solutions	 to	 the	problems	 that	 we	 take	 to	 be	 important.	 After	 introducing	 the	 notion	 of	 a	 primitive	posit,	I	discuss	the	different	kinds	of	primitives	that	we	might	posit.	Following	Cowling	(2013),	 I	 distinguish	 between	 ontological	 and	 ideological	 primitives,	 and,	 following	Benovsky	(2013)	between	 functional	and	content	views	of	primitives.	 I	 then	propose	that	 these	 two	 distinctions	 cut	 across	 each	 other	 leading	 to	 four	 types	 of	 primitive	posits.	 I	 then	 argue	 that	 theoretical	 virtues	 should	 be	 taken	 to	 be	 meta-theoretical	ideological	primitives.	I	close	with	some	reflections	on	the	global	nature	of	comparing	sets	of	primitives.	
1.	Primitives	and	Theories	A	term	is	primitive	within	a	theory	when,	relative	to	that	theory,	the	term	cannot	be	defined	in	a	non-circular	way.	Given	that	circularity	of	definition	provides	no	further	insight	into	the	meaning	of	the	term	that	we	are	attempting	to	define,	a	primitive	must	be	accepted	as	non-definable,	or	un-analysable.	All	 theories	require	primitives,	and	primitives	are	explanatorily	basic.	No	theory	that	 hopes	 to	 be	 explanatory	 can	 forever	 introduce	 new	 terms	 in	 order	 to	 define	 other	 terms.	Without	 primitives,	 a	 theory	 would	 contain	 an	 infinite	 regress	 of	 terms.	 The	 choice	 of	primitive(s)	is	up	to	the	creator	of	the	theory.	Anyone	is	free	to	declare	any	part	of	their	theory	as	primitive.	Some	disagreements	between	theories	can	be	analysed	as	disagreements	about	what	to	 take	 as	 primitive.	 This	 is	 especially	 the	 case	 if	 we	 think	 that	 the	 commitments	 of	 a	 theory	should	 be	 derivable	 from	 the	 primitives	 of	 that	 theory,	 or	 that	 the	 primitives	will	 provide	 the	ultimate	explanation	of	various	aspects	of	the	theory.		For	example,	and	as	has	been	discussed	extensively	 in	Benovsky	(2013,	2016),	 take	the	debate	about	 attribute	 agreement	 in	metaphysics.	 The	 central	 question	 is	 ‘how	 is	 it	 possible	 that	 two	objects	share	the	same	property?’	The	debate	is	highly	complex,	but	let	us	focus	on	three	possible	solutions.	 First,	 there	 are	 those	 that	 posit	 a	 bare	 particular	 that	 instantiates	 a	 repeatable,	multiply	 located	universal.	Under	this	view,	 two	objects	a	and	b	 share	the	same	property	F	 if	a	and	 b	 both	 instantiate	 the	 numerically	 identical	 universal	 F-ness	 (see	 Armstrong	 1978,	Mertz	2001).	 Second,	 the	 tropes-bundle	 view.	 This	 view	 holds	 that	 there	 is	 no	 bare	 particular	 or	substrata,	 and	 that	 instead	 all	 that	 an	 object	 is	 is	 a	 bundle	 of	 compresent	 non-repeatable	 and	non-multiply	locatable	property	tropes.	Two	objects	a	and	b	share	a	property	if	they	both	have	as	part	 (or	 as	 constituent	 of,	 or	 have	 as	 a	 member)	 numerically	 distinct	 F-tropes	 that	 are	qualitatively	identical	(see	Williams	1953,	Paul	2017).	Third,	we	could	take	objects	as	a	primitive,	
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non-analysed	entity.	This	‘resemblance	nominalism’	view	holds	that	a	and	b	both	share	the	same	property	if	they	are	both	members	of	the	same	resemblance	class	(see	Rodriguez-Pereyra	2002).	Each	 of	 these	 views	 has	 been	 defended	 in	 the	 literature	 recently,	 and	 each	 seems	 to	 be	 a	currently	live	option	to	explain	attribute	agreement.	These	briefly	sketched	solutions	to	the	metaphysical	puzzle	all	posit	important	primitive	notions.	The	 first	 says	 that	 there	 is	a	primitive	 identity	relation	between	one	 instance	of	a	universal,	F-ness,	and	another	instance	of	F-ness;	the	second	holds	that	a	primitive	exact	resemblance	holds	between	two	property	 tropes;	and	the	third	says	that	 there	 is	a	primitive	resemblance	relation	between	 objects	a	 and	b.	 In	 each	 case,	 (at	 least)	 a	 primitive	 relation	 is	 appealed	 to,	 and,	 as	 it	happens,	in	theories	two	and	three	a	resemblance	relation.	The	 primitives	 in	 all	 three	 theories	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 providing	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 original	question	of	when	is	it	the	case	that	two	objects	share	the	same	property.	This	kind	of	primitive	is	what	 Benovsky	 calls	 a	 ‘problem-solver’	 (2013:	 344).	 Without	 these	 primitives,	 each	 of	 the	theories	would	not	be	able	to	solve	the	original	problem.	That	the	primitives	play	this	important	explanatory	role	 is	not	a	problem	for	the	theories.	Positing	a	primitive	that	does	no	theoretical	work	 would	 seem	 needlessly	 profligate,	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	 accepted	 that	 primitives	 should	 be	explanatory.	 Given	 that	 they	 sit	 at	 the	 most	 explanatorily	 basic	 level,	 if	 a	 primitive	 has	 no	explanatory	role,	then	it	would	appear	to	be	redundant.		However,	 there	 is	 a	 lingering	 problem:	 are	 the	 primitives	 that	 we	 pick	 to	 play	 the	 role	 of	problem-solvers	 ad	 hoc?	 An	 intuitive	 way	 to	 understand	 if	 a	 posit	 is	 ad	 hoc	 is	 if	 the	 posit	 is	introduced	to	save	a	theory	from	a	particular	problem	and	there	is	no	additional	reason	to	posit	it	except	to	solve	that	problem.1	The	issue	is	that	primitives	will	often,	at	least	to	those	who	wish	to	 object	 to	 the	 theory	 in	 question,	 look	 like	 they	 are	 ad	 hoc.	 To	 the	 person	 who	 accepts	universals	 and	 so	 uses	 a	 numerical	 identity	 relation	 between	 universals	 to	 explain	 attribute	resemblance,	the	trope	theorist’s	posit	of	a	resemblance	relation	looks	ad	hoc.	And	vice	versa.	We	are	taught	that	we	should	avoid	ad	hoc	posits,	but	whether	we	think	that	a	primitive	is	ad-hoc	or	not	seems	to	depend	on	the	viewpoint	from	which	you	are	viewing	the	posit	in	question.	Those	inclined	towards	a	theory	will	likely	not	find	a	posit	to	be	ad	hoc;	to	those	opposed	to	the	theory,	the	opposite	could	well	be	the	case.	What	we	need	 is	a	way	to	compare	primitive	choices	 to	see	which	 is	 to	be	preferred.	Typically	this	is	done	through	a	consideration	of	a	range	of	theoretical	virtues,	the	relative	importance	of	which	is	not	universally	agreed	upon.	This	means	that	what	counts	as	a	good	or	more	favourable	primitive	 is	 decided	 by	 a	 range	 of	 further	 concerns	 and	 commitments,	many	 of	which	 are	 not	always	fully	explicated,	or	are,	I	will	argue,	themselves	further	primitive	commitments.		In	the	rest	of	this	paper,	I	will	take	up	this	question	of	how	we	pick	between	primitives.	Are	all																																																									1		 This	is	not	offered	as	a	precise	definition	of	what	makes	a	posit	ad	hoc.	Nothing	in	this	paper	rests	on	a	specific	notion	of	what	it	is	for	something	to	be	ad	hoc,	only	that	there	is	a	distinction	between	ad	hoc	and	non-ad	hoc	posits.	
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primitives	created	equal?	Are	there	some	that	are	inherently	better	than	others?	I	will	begin	by	sketching	some	distinctions	that	are	important	in	understanding	the	different	kinds	of	primitives	that	 a	 theory	might	 appeal	 to,	 before	 commenting	 on	 how	we	might	 begin	 to	 choose	 between	primitives.	My	examples	will	come	from	metaphysics,	but	primitive	choice	is	an	important	issue	in	all	theories	and	as	such	what	I	say	here	will	carry	over	into	other	areas.	
2.	Ideology	vs.	Ontology	The	 difference	 between	 ideology	 and	 ontology	 is	 a	 much-discussed	 distinction	 dating	 back	 at	least	to	Quine:	Given	a	theory,	one	philosophically	interesting	aspect	of	it	into	which	we	can	inquire	 is	 its	 ontology:	 what	 entities	 are	 the	 variables	 of	 quantification	 to	range	over	if	the	theory	is	to	hold	true?	Another	no	less	important	aspect	into	which	we	can	inquire	is	its	ideology	(this	seems	the	inevitable	word,	despite	unwanted	connotations):	what	 ideas	can	be	expressed	 in	 it?	 ...	 It	 is	clearer,	 I	think,	 to	recognize	 in	ontology	and	 ideology	two	distinct	domains	of	 inquiry	(Quine,	1951:	14).	Ontology	is	what	exists;	ideology	concerns	the	concepts	that	appear	within	the	theory.	Primitive	ontological	commitments	are	 those	entities	within	our	 theory	that	are	non-reducible	 to	 further	entities;2	primitive	 ideological	 commitments	are	 those	 concepts	within	a	 theory	 that	 cannot	be	defined	in	terms	of	other	concepts.3		It	 is	often	held	that	 the	non-primitives	aspects	of	a	 theory	will	 ‘come	for	 free’,	what	Armstrong	described	 as	 an	 ‘ontological	 free	 lunch’	 (1997:	 12).	His	 focus	was	 specifically	 on	 those	 entities	that	supervene	on,	or	are	entailed	by	 the	primitive	entities.	But	 the	notion	can	be	expanded	 to	cover	ideology	too.	An	 ‘ideological	free	lunch’	then	refers	to	those	concepts	that	we	get	for	free	once	we	have	accepted	the	primitive	ideological	concepts.	The	‘free’	concepts	are	definable	from	the	primitive	ideology.		The	decision	to	favour	(primitive)	ontological	or	ideological	posits	within	the	theory	is	a	choice	that	can	have	a	wide	influence	on	the	character	of	that	theory.	Take	as	an	example	debates	about	modality.	An	actualist	wants	to	 limit	their	ontology	to	 just	those	entities	that	exist	 in	the	actual	world,	 denying	 the	 existence	 of	 mere	 possibilia.	 There	 are	 many	 ways	 to	 do	 this,	 but	 one																																																									2		 One	alternative	way	to	understand	this	would	be	to	say	that	the	primitive	ontological	commitments	are	those	entities	we	take	to	be	fundamental.	Under	this	conception,	the	fundamental	entities	are	the	most	basic	 elements	 of	 reality,	 from	which	 other	 elements	 of	 reality	 are	 derived,	 or	 ultimately	 ground	 the	non-fundamental.	 Nothing	 I	 say	 here	 rests	 on	 this	 notion	 of	 fundamentality.	 See	 Bliss	 (2017)	 for	 a	discussion	of	various	roles	that	the	notion	of	‘fundamental’	can	play	in	our	theorising.	3		 To	 see	 the	 difference	 in	 action,	 in	 the	 example	 about	 attribute	 agreement,	 in	 theory	 one,	 the	 bare	particulars	and	 the	universals	would	be	ontologically	primitive,	 and	 the	 instantiation	relation	and	 the	identity	 relation	 between	 universals	 a	 primitive	 ideological	 commitment.	 In	 theory	 two,	 the	 tropes	would	be	the	sole	ontological	primitive,	and	the	instantiation	relation,	the	compresence	relation,	and	the	resemblance	 relation	would	 be	 ideologically	 primitive.	 In	 theory	 three,	 the	 objects	would	 be	 the	 sole	ontological	 primitive,	 and	 the	 resemblance	 relation	 between	 those	 objects	 would	 be	 ideologically	primitive.	
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prominent	route	is	to	refuse	to	analyse	the	modal	operators.	The	modal	operators	are	accepted	as	primitive	bits	of	ideology	within	the	theory,	thereby	allowing	us	to	limit	the	number	of	entities	that	we	are	committed	to	in	our	ontology.	This	kind	of	actualist	favours	ontological	parsimony	at	the	cost	of	a	more	complicated	ideology	(see	Fine	1977).		In	 contrast,	 Lewis’	 modal	 realism	 (1986)	 favours	 ideological	 parsimony	 over	 the	 ontological	variant.	Lewis	wants	to	reduce	modal	claims,	rejecting	the	idea	that	modal	claims	are	irreducibly	intensional.	Instead,	modal	claims	are	extensional	claims	about	worlds,	and	the	entities	in	those	possible	worlds.	These	are	 real,	 concrete	entities	and	Lewis	 is	 fully	ontologically	 committed	 to	them.	 This	 delivers	 ideological	 simplicity	 for	 Lewis	 as	 he	 no	 longer	 is	 required	 to	 accept	 un-analysable	modal	operators.	It	is	for	similar	reasons	that	Lewis	accepted	the	existence	of	sets	in	order	to	gain	the	benefits	of	set	theory:	It	offers	an	improvement	in	what	Quine	calls	ideology,	paid	for	in	the	coin	of	ontology.	 It’s	 an	 offer	 you	 can’t	 refuse.	 The	 price	 is	 right;	 the	 benefits	 in	theoretical	unity	and	economy	are	well	worth	 the	entities…	 the	benefits	are	worth	their	ontological	cost	(Lewis,	1986:	3–4).	The	 moral	 here	 is	 that	 ontological	 and	 ideological	 parsimony	 will	 often	 be	 a	 trade	 off.	 An	ontological	posit	might	reduce	ideological	cost	and	vice	versa,	but	it	is	far	from	clear,	prima	facie,	which	 we	 should	 prefer.	 Why	 should	 we	 think	 that	 ontological	 parsimony	 is	 better	 than	ideological	parsimony?	Given	that,	as	noted	above,	we	all	must	posit	some	primitives	within	our	theories,	which	of	 these	kinds	of	primitives	 should	we	prefer?	 Should	we	 in	our	 theories	posit	ontological	or	ideological	primitives?	From	debates	about	modality,	we	can	see	that	this	choice	is	not	a	clear	one.4	A	further	consideration	that	appears	when	we	want	to	decide	on	whether	to	posit	ontological	or	ideological	primitives	has	been	discussed	by	Cowling	(2013).	This	relates	to	two	distinct	ways	in	which	 a	 theory	 might	 be	 ontologically	 parsimonious	 and	 two	 ways	 in	 which	 it	 might	 be	ideologically	parsimonious:	NO-Parsimony:	 Quantitative	 ontological	 parsimony,	 which	 concerns	 the	number	of	ontological	commitments.	KO-Parsimony:	 Qualitative	 ontological	 parsimony,	 which	 concerns	 the	number	of	kinds	of	ontological	commitments.	NI-Parsimony:	 Quantitative	 ideological	 parsimony,	 which	 concerns	 the	number	of	ideological	commitments.	KI-Parsimony:	 Quantitative	 ideological	 parsimony,	 which	 concerns	 the																																																									4		 See	 Shapiro	 (1993)	 for	 a	more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 ontology-ideology	 trade-off,	 and	 the	 use	 of	Occam’s	razor	in	the	case	of	modality	(though	Shapiro	does	not	discuss,	as	I	do	here,	the	question	of	the	primitiveness	of	the	theoretical	virtues	themselves).	The	moral	of	Shapiro’s	discussion	is	much	the	same	as	 mine	 –	 a	 reduction	 of	 ontology	 for	 ideology,	 or	 vice	 versa	 must	 be	 philosophically	 justified,	 and	Occam’s	razor	cannot	be	‘wielded	blindly’	(1993:	473).	
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number	 of	 kinds	 of	 ideological	 commitments.	 (see	 Cowling	 2013:	 3897;	2017).	Thus,	 the	 choice	 between	 favouring	 a	 parsimonious	 ontology	 or	 ideology	 is	more	 complicated	than	it	first	seemed	to	be.	Take	Lewis’	acceptance	of	the	existence	of	sets.	Lewis	could	claim	that	whilst	 he	 is	 rejecting	 NO-Parsimony	 as	 he	 accepts	 the	 existence	 of	 sets,	 he	 is	 respecting	 KO-Parsimony	 as	 the	 entities	 that	 he	 is	 accepting	 are	 all	 of	 the	 same	 kind.	 As	 Lewis	 states:	 ‘I	subscribe	to	the	general	view	that	qualitative	parsimony	is	good	in	a	philosophical	or	empirical	hypothesis;	but	I	recognize	no	presumption	whatever	in	favour	of	quantitative	parsimony’	(1973:	87).	Cowling	 is	 less	 clear	 about	 how	we	might	 draw	 the	 kind	 vs.	 number	 distinction	 in	 the	 case	 of	ideological	parsimony.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	we	have	less	of	a	grip	on	how	it	could	be	that	some	bits	of	ideology	are	of	the	same	kind.	Perhaps	ideological	kindhood	is	too	mysterious	to	be	useful.	However,	as	Cowling	notes:	KO-Parsimony	 does	 not	 come	with	 a	 comprehensive	 analysis	 of	 ontological	kindhood,	but	has	not	been	dismissed	on	these	grounds.	And,	while	one	might	propose	 that	 ontological	 kinds	 are	 simply	 natural	 kinds	 like	 tiger	 and	electron,	 such	 a	 proposal	 precludes	 a	 suitably	 general	 application	 of	ontological	 parsimony	 to	 contexts	 where	 theoretical	 virtues	 are	 crucial	 but	natural	kinds	are	not	relevant	(e.g.,	murder	mysteries	and	set	theory).	There	is,	 then,	 no	 settled	 account	 of	 ontological	 kindhood.	But,	 since	 this	does	not	license	us	 to	reject	 (KO-Parsimony),	we	have	no	compelling	reason	 to	reject	or	dismiss	(KI-Parsimony)	(Cowling,	2013:	3898).	Whilst	I	agree	with	Cowling	on	this	point,	we	can	at	least	point	to	an	example	of	a	debate	where	we	seem	to	understand	the	idea	of	an	ideological	kind	to	show	that	we	do	have	a	working	grasp	of	 the	 idea.	 The	 example	 comes	 from	 recent	 defences	 of	 ‘big-G	 Grounding’	 (hereafter	 just	‘grounding’).		Proponents	 of	 grounding	 argue	 that	 grounding	 is	 one	 relation	 that	 can	 replace	 instances	 of	 a	variety	of	metaphysical	relations	that	we	previously	have	thought	to	be	distinct.	Grounding	is	a	unitary	notion,	and	one	that	can	replace	various	more	variegated	relations	that	metaphysicians	have	otherwise	been	interested	in	(see	Audi	2012;	Rosen	2010;	Schaffer	2009).	Grounding	is	also	widely	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 primitive	 (see	 Fine	 2012;	Rodriguez-Pereyra	 2005;	Rosen	 2010;	 Schaffer	2009;	Witmer	et	al.	2005).	Importantly	for	my	purposes	here,	grounding	is	additionally	taken	to	be	an	internal	relation.5	This	means	that	it	is	not	a	further	ontological	posit,	but	rather	holds	just																																																									5		 That	grounding	is	internal	is	a	common	assumption	within	the	literature;	see	Raven	(2015),	and	Rosen	(2010).	 Indeed,	 that	 grounding	 is	 internal	 is	 part	 of	why	 Bernstein	 (2016)	 and	 Schaffer	 (2016)	 both	argue	that	grounding	and	causation	must	be	distinguished,	as	causation	is	not	internal.	Bennett	(2011:	33)	goes	further	to	argue	that	grounding	is	‘superinternal’,	though	note	that	Bennett	is	explicit	that	the	claim	that	grounding	is	superinternal	should	not	lead	us	to	think	that	it	is	not	internal,	as	she	holds	that	every	superinternal	relation	is	also	internal.	
	 6	
in	 virtue	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 relata	 it	 relates,	 and	 the	 intrinsic	 nature	 of	 those	 relata.	Grounding	is,	I	will	assume,	a	bit	of	ideology,	not	ontology.	Schaffer	provides	the	relations	between	the	following	entities	as	‘clear	examples	of	grounding’:	(i)	the	entity	and	its	singleton,		(ii)	the	Swiss	cheese	and	its	holes,		(iii)	natural	features	and	moral	features,		(iv)	sparse	properties	and	abundant	properties	(v)	truthmakers	and	truths	(Schaffer,	2009:	375)	For	 its	 proponents,	 grounding	 simplifies	 and	 unifies	 an	 otherwise	 overly	 complex	 family	 of	relations	that	are	all	variants	of	ontological	dependence,	and	this	parsimony	is	certainly	a	major	part	of	why	grounding	is	popular.6	However,	 not	 everyone	 is	 convinced.	 One	 prominent	 line	 of	 dissent	 has	 been	 to	 argue	 that	grounding	is	not	a	unitary	relation.	The	argument	here	is	not	to	deny	that	there	are	metaphysical	relations	between	entities	of	the	kinds	listed	above,	but	just	that	the	relations	are	not	the	same.	Koslicki	 (2015)	 argues	 that	 two	 claimed	 examples	 of	 grounding	 relations	 –	 the	 determinable-determinate	relation	and	the	Aristotelian	genus-species	relation	–	are	importantly	different	and	cannot	actually	be	instances	of	the	same	relation.	Wilson	(2014)	independently,	but	to	a	similar	conclusion,	argues	 that	a	number	of	 the	relations	which	are	 taken	 to	be	 instance	of	grounding,	such	 as	 token	 identity,	 realization,	 the	 classical	 extensional	 part-whole	 relation,	 the	 set	membership	relation,	the	proper	subset	relation,	and	the	determinable-determinate	relation	are	too	distinct	to	be	unified	under	one	course-grained	metaphysical	relation.		The	grounding	proponents	 are	 therefore	 arguing	 that	 grounding	 is	 a	univocal	 ideological	 kind.	Many	of	the	more	fine-grained	relations	that	metaphysicians	had	previously	been	focused	on	are	replaced	with	instances	that	kind.	However,	the	dispute	is	not	about	the	number	of	instances	of	the	relations	that	there	are.	Rather	it	is	about	whether	all	the	instances	are	in	fact	instances	of	a	single	 univocal	 kind.	 The	 objections	 held	 that	 instead	we	 need	 a	 number	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	ontological	dependence	relations	(at	least	some	of	which,	presumably,	would	be	primitive).	The	disagreement	 is	 over	 the	 numbers	 of	kinds,	 not	 about	 the	 number	 of	 instances.	 The	 two	 sides	might	agree	on	how	many	instances	of	grounding	or	ontological	dependence	relations	hold	in	the	world;	they	disagree	about	whether	we	need	to	posit	one	or	more	ideological	kinds.	The	example	of	grounding	illustrates	that	we	have	some	grip	on	the	idea	of	an	ideological	kind.	We	can	also	point	at	a	potential	instance	of	kindhood	in	ideology	that	will	significantly	influence																																																									6		 The	 applications	 for	 grounding	 have	 so	 far	 included	 (amongst	 others)	 metaphysical	 foundationalism	(Schaffer	 2010a),	 truthmaking	 (Cameron	 forthcoming;	 Liggins	 2012;	 Schaffer	 2010b),	 intrinsicality	(Witmer	2014,	Rosen	2010),	perceptual	knowledge	(Chudnoff	2011),	temporal	ontology	(Baron	2014),	and	 the	 nature	 of	 mental	 content	 (Trogdon	 2015).	 Whilst	 of	 course	 these	 papers	 overlap,	 they	 are	independent	discussions	of	grounding,	relative	to	the	specific	aims	listed	here.	
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the	 very	 plausibility	 of	 the	 theory	 in	 question.	 This	 time	 consider	 ontological	 pluralism.	 The	ontological	pluralist	believes	that	there	are	multiple	different	ways	in	which	things	can	exist	(or,	if	preferred,	multiple	ways	of	being).	Aristotle,	Aquinas,	Descartes,	Russell,	Moore,	and	Heidegger	have	all	at	different	times	been	seen	as,	or	perhaps	accused	of	being,	ontological	pluralists	(see	Turner	2010;	see	McDaniel	2009,	2017	for	a	recent	defence).	My	focus	will	be	to	comment	on	one	particular	argument	against	ontological	pluralism,	namely	that	it	is	an	unparsimonious	theory,	as	it	requires	the	positing	of	multiple	quantifiers.		Quantifiers	are	a	classic	example	of	bits	of	 ideology.	Quantifiers	do	not	 ‘exist’	 in	 the	way	that	a	table	does.	Quantifiers	rather	are	bits	of	our	theorising	that	help	us	understand	the	commitments	and	consequences	of	those	theories.	Thus,	the	claim	against	the	ontological	pluralist	is	that	they	posit	an	unneeded	multiplication	of	ideology.	Occam’s	razor	is	invoked,	and	ontological	pluralism	is	rejected.	The	ontological	pluralist	might	respond	by	rejecting	the	underlying	Quinean	criterion	of	 ontological	 commitment,	 but	 let	 us	 assume	 that	 they	 wish	 to	 maintain	 the	 criterion.	 Our	ontological	pluralist	therefore	will	likely	say	something	like	this:	ontology	 is	about	what	existential	quantifiers	range	over.	 I	 simply	deny	 that	there	 is	only	one	of	 them.	Rather,	 there	are	many	—	maybe	one,	 ‘∃1’,	which	ranges	 over	 abstracta,	 for	 instance,	 and	 another,	 ‘∃2’	 which	 ranges	 over	concreta.	If	you	want	to	talk	about	abstracta,	you	have	to	use	‘∃1’;	if	you	want	to	talk	about	concreta,	you	have	to	use	‘∃2’	(Turner,	2010:	7-8).	Of	 course,	 saying	 this	 is	 what	 allows	 room	 for	 the	 parsimony	 argument.	 Why	 posit	 multiple	quantifiers	when,	at	least	so	the	ontological	monist	will	say,	we	can	make	do	with	just	one?	I	will	leave	 aside	 here	 Turner’s	 discussion	 on	 the	 parsimony	 argument	 (what	 he	 calls	 the	 ‘economy	argument’;	2010:	28-34).	His	responses	may	be	sufficient	for	ontological	pluralists.	I	wish	to	offer	at	least	the	seeds	of	a	further	response	that	could	be	developed.	The	 new	 response	 holds	 that	whilst	 the	 ontological	 pluralist	might	 be	 rejecting	NI-Parsimony,	they	accept	and	embrace	KI-Parsimony,	which	says	that	the	number	of	primitives	in	a	theory	is	not	important.	What	is	important	is	the	number	of	kinds	of	primitives.	It	certainly	does	seem	to	be	 possible	 for	 the	 ontological	 pluralist	 to	 argue	 that	 they	 are	 positing	 only	 one	 kind	 of	ideological	primitive	–	primitive	existential	quantifiers	–	just	like	the	ontological	monist.	Working	 out	 the	 full	 details	 of	 this	 response	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 Perhaps	 the	monist	will	respond	that	the	distinct	quantifiers	are	in	fact	different	kinds	after	all.	My	contention	is	 only	 that	 given	 that	 this	 option	 would	 at	 least	 prima	 facie	 be	 available	 to	 the	 ontological	pluralist,	then	we	can	see	that	ideological	kindhood,	and	the	difference	between	the	four	forms	of	parsimony	listed	above	is	important	when	it	comes	to	creating	and	defending	a	theory.	It	is	not	enough	 for	 the	 ontological	 monist	 to	 complain	 that	 ontological	 pluralism	 is	 unparsimonious	simpliciter.	They	must	also	argue	that	we	should	be	motivated	by	NI-Parsimony.	How	we	might	do	that	without	begging	the	question	against	the	ontological	pluralist	is	less	clear.		
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3.	Functional	Role	vs.	Content		A	further	distinction	that	is	relevant	to	comparing	primitives	comes	from	Benovsky	(2008,	2013,	2016).	 This	 concerns	 the	 role	 and	 nature	 of	 the	 primitive	 within	 our	 theories.	 The	 first	understands	 primitives	 through	 the	 function	 that	 the	 primitive	 is	 introduced	 to	 play.	 Such	primitives	 are	 introduced	 with	 little	 (or	 even	 no)	 comment	 as	 to	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	 the	primitive	itself.	Their	nature	remains	something	like	a	Lockean	‘we-know-not-what’,	and	they	are	introduced	instead	just	as	a	‘we-do-know-what-they-do’	(Benovsky	2013:	345).	The	nature	of	the	primitive	 remains	 a	mystery,	 but	we	 get	 a	 grip	 on	 the	 primitive	 through	 the	 functional	 role	 it	plays.	 A	 good	 example	 of	 this	 is	 instantiation.	 Relatively	 little	 is	 said	 about	 the	 nature	 of	instantiation.	Armstrong,	when	introducing	instantiation	only	remarks	that	it	is	a	tie	that	holds	a	universal	and	a	bare	particular	together	(1997).	What	the	primitive	does	is	more	important	than	what	it	is.		Alternatively,	 a	 content	 view	 of	 primitives	 says	 that	 there	 is	more	 to	 a	 primitive	 than	 just	 its	functional	role.	As	Benovsky	notes:	‘under	this	view,	if	two	primitives	perform	the	same	function,	they	may	 still	 not	be	 the	 same	 thing,	 and	 thus	 they	may	not	be	metaphysically	 equivalent,	 but	only	 theoretically	 equivalent	 (that	 is,	 equivalent	 for	 all	 theoretical	 purposes).	 The	 slogan	 goes:	even	if	they	do	the	same	thing,	they	are	not	the	same	thing’	(2013:	346).	Perhaps	 one	 way	 to	 grasp	 this	 distinction	 is	 through	 an	 analogy	 to	 the	 debate	 between	 the	categoricalist	 and	 dispositionalist	 about	 properties.	 The	 dispositionalist	 will	 say	 that	 there	 is	nothing	more	 to	a	property	 than	what	 it	disposes	an	object	 to	do	 –	nothing	beyond	 the	 causal	powers	that	it	bestows	upon	the	property.	The	‘disposition	is	thought	to	be	a	persisting	state	or	condition	that	makes	possible	the	manifestation’	(Mumford	2010).	A	property	in	the	actual	world	is	the	same	property	in	some	possible	world	iff	it	bestows	the	same	causal	profile	on	the	object	in	that	possible	world	 that	 instantiates	 it	 as	 it	does	 in	 the	actual	world.	The	 categoricalist	 rejects	this.	For	example,	Armstrong	(1989,	1997)	says	that	there	is	a	 ‘quiddity’	to	a	property	–	a	this-ness	for	properties.	This	means	that	the	same	property	could	have	a	different	causal	profile	(or	bestow	alternative	causal	powers	to	an	object)	in	different	possible	worlds.	Properties	are	more	than	just	their	causal	profile.7	Analogously,	 if	 a	primitive	 is	understood	purely	 functionally,	 then	 there	 is	no	sense	 in	which	a	different	primitive	could	play	 the	same	 functional	 role.	 If	a	primitive	plays	 the	same	 functional	role	in	a	different	theory,	then	they	are	the	same	primitive.	In	contrast,	under	the	content	view,	numerically	different	primitives	could	play	the	same	functional	role.	Benovsky’s	 distinction	 is	 a	 valid	 one,	 but	 overlooked	 is	 how	 the	 ideology/ontology	 distinction	plays	 into	 this.	Benovsky	 largely	skates	over	 the	 ideology/ontology	distinction,	or	 reduces	 that	distinction	to	one	of	the	primitives	having	a	different	functional	profile.	For	example,	he	states:	
																																																								7		 Not	 all	 categoricalists	will	 accept	 quiddities,	 however	 these	more	 complex	 details	 do	 not	 bear	 on	 the	analogy	being	used	here.	For	an	overview	of	this	debate,	see	Choi	and	Fara	2012.	
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Think	of	the	claim	that	one	theory’s	problem-solver	is	a	relation	and	the	other	theory’s	 problem-solver	 is	 a	 substratum,	 and	 so	 they	 are	 entities	 with	 a	different	nature.	What	does	such	a	claim	amount	to?	Perhaps	what	one	wants	to	 say	 here	 is	 that	 there	 are	 some	 differences	 between	 the	 two	 problem-solvers	 like,	 for	 instance,	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 substratum	 is	 ‘ontologically	independent’	(that	is,	it	can	exist	without	exemplifying	any	properties)	while	the	 relation	of	 compresence	 cannot	 just	 ‘be	 there’	 and	 relate	nothing.	But	 if	that	 were	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 problem-solvers,	 interestingly,	 it	would	be	a	 functional	difference:	 it	would	be	something	 the	substratum	can	do	 (‘standing	 alone’,	 tying	no	properties	 together)	 that	 compresence	 cannot	do.	 So,	 in	 such	 a	 case,	 the	 Functional	 View	 applies:	 there	 is	 a	 difference	between	the	two	problem-solvers,	and	it	is	a	functional	one	(Benovsky,	2013:	349-50).	Benovsky	 takes	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 primitives	 to	 be	 one	 of	 function	 as	 part	 of	 his	argument	 that	 we	 should	 prefer	 the	 functional	 view	 over	 the	 content	 view.	 However,	 a	 more	natural	understanding	of	 this	 is	 through	 the	 ideology/ontology	distinction.	 Let	us	 consider	 the	first	two	options	from	the	above	discussion	of	attribute	agreement	to	explore	this	fully.		The	 substrata-universal	 theory	 posits	 two	 primitive	 ontological	 entities	 –	 universal	 properties	and	 substratum	 –	 and	 two	 ideological	 primitives	 –	 an	 instantiation	 relation	 and	 an	 identity	relation	between	instances	of	the	same	universal.	We	might	be	inclined	to	initially	think	of	these	relations	as	further	ontological	entities	but	that	would	be	wrong.	These	relations	are	taken	to	be	
formal.	They	are	formal	in	the	same	way	that	ontological	categories	are	formal	and	thus	are	not	further	elements	of	reality	beyond	the	existence	of	the	entities	that	fall	under	those	categories.8	The	same	goes	 for	the	relations	of	 instantiation	and	 identity.	They	are	 ideological	primitives	as	they	cannot	be	defined	or	analysed	 further	within	 that	 theory;	but	 they	come	at	no	ontological	cost	(they	are	an	‘ontological	free	lunch’),	as	they	are	internal	relations.9		Alternatively,	the	bundle-trope	theorist	posits	just	one	primitive	ontological	entity	–	tropes	–	and																																																									8		 Ontological	categories	are	part	of	the	ideology	of	our	theory.	They	do	not	exist	as	further	entities	over	and	above	of	the	entities	that	fall	 into	those	categories.	The	members	of	the	categories	are	ontological	commitments;	the	categories	are	ideological.	See	Lowe	(2006)	for	a	view	like	this,	and	Miller	(2016)	for	defence	of	that	view.	9		 Internal	 relations	 are	 contrasted	 with	 ‘external’	 relations,	 which	 are	 additional	 entities	 –	 additional	ontological	 posits.	 In	 contrast,	 internal	 relations	 are	 part	 of	 the	 ideology	 of	 a	 theory	 as	 statements	involving	the	relations	will	express	truths	(‘Object	O	instantiates	property	p’	expresses	a	truth	about	O),	but	 the	 truthmakers	 for	 the	statement	will	be	non-relational.	 If,	 say,	 causal	 relations	are	external	 (see	references	in	footnote	5,	though	see	Lowe	(2016),	Simons	(2016),	Heil	(2016)	for	arguments	against	the	externality	of	causation)	then	statements	about	causal	relations	also	express	truths,	but	the	truthmakers	for	those	statements	will	 involve	the	positing	of	a	relational	property.	This	would	mean	that	causation	will	be	a	genuine	 relational	property	within	our	ontology,	not	 just	our	 ideology.	None	of	 this,	 though,	rules	out	some	internal	relations	that	are	part	of	our	ideology	being	primitive	as	in	the	case	of	identity	and	 instantiation.	They	are	 internal	 for	 the	reasons	stated,	and	primitive	as	 they	cannot	be	defined	or	analysed	further	within	that	theory.	External	relations	may	also	be	primitive	ontological	commitments.	For	 example,	 if	 we	 believe	 that	 causal	 relations	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 non-causal	 properties	 then	causation	would	appear	to	be	a	primitive	ontological	commitment	of	that	theory.	For	examples	of	this,	see	Tooley	(1987)	and	Carroll	(1994).	
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three	 ideological	 primitives	 –	 an	 instantiation	 relation,	 a	 compresence	 relation,	 and	 an	 (exact)	resemblance	 relation.	 These	 relations	 are	 ideological	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	 under	 the	 substrata-universal	theory.	They	are	no	‘addition’	to	our	ontology.	They	are	formal	concepts	that	we	use	in	order	to	describe	the	nature	of	reality.	Once	 again	 leaving	 aside	 debates	 about	 which	 of	 these	 views	 is	 correct	 (and	 various	 more	complex	versions	of	these	views),	we	can	see	the	difference	in	what	‘problem-solving’	primitive	has	been	 invoked.	As	Benovsky	states:	 ‘one	 theory’s	problem-solver	 is	a	 relation	and	 the	other	theory’s	 problem-solver	 is	 a	 substratum’	 (2013:	 349).	 This	 means	 that	 one	 is	 an	 ontological	primitive	whilst	the	other	is	an	ideological	primitive.	To	clarify,	my	claim	is	not	to	deny	that	there	is	potentially	a	difference	here	in	function	or	in	content.	That	may	be	the	case.	My	claim	is	only	that	there	is	at	least	also	a	difference	in	choosing	an	ontological	or	an	ideological	primitive	in	this	case.	The	difference	between	the	primitives	is	at	least	partly	explained	by	the	difference	that	one	is	ontological	and	the	other	ideological.		With	 this	 in	mind,	 I	 propose	 that	 these	 two	 distinctions	 cut	 across	 each	 other	 leading	 to	 four	options	for	a	primitive.	A	primitive	that	we	posit	could	be:	1)	A	purely	functional	ideological	posit	2)	A	purely	functional	ontological	posit	3)	A	non-purely	functional	ideological	posit	(the	content	view)	4)	A	non-purely	functional	ontological	posit	(the	content	view).	This	four-way	distinction	illustrates	quite	how	different	primitives	can	be.	However,	I	will	outline	one	further	kind	of	primitive	before	commenting	on	how	we	go	about	primitive	choice.	
4.	Theoretical	Virtues	as	Primitives	We	 have	 seen	 that	 a	 primitive	 can	 come	 in	 four	 types,	 as	 created	 by	 the	 intersection	 of	 the	ideology/ontology	and	the	functional/content	distinctions.	We	have	also	seen	how	when	we	try	to	compare	primitives,	we	must	be	aware	of	quantative	and	qualitative	parsimony.	This	means	that	at	least	with	respect	to	parsimony,	we	can	favour	(or	reject)	kind	or	number	parsimony	for	each	of	 these	primitive	types.	Given	this,	and	the	potential	effect	 that	parsimony	could	have	on	our	primitive	 choice,	we	might	ask	what	parsimony	really	 is.	My	claim	will	be	 that	parsimony,	and	other	theoretical	virtues,	are	primitives	too,	albeit	ones	that	do	not	fit	neatly	into	any	of	the	above	categories.	We	 have	 already	 seen	 that	 parsimony	 comes	 in	 many	 different	 forms.	 However,	 those	distinctions	provide	neither	a	definition	nor	 justification	of	parsimony.	Why	should	we	believe	that	parsimony	 is	a	virtue	 in	our	 theories?	 I	 am	not	 the	 first	 to	question	what	our	warrant	 for	
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accepting	parsimony	(or	the	related	notion	of	simplicity)	is.10		There	 are	 two	 initial	 reasons	 why	 we	 might	 support	 parsimony.	 First,	 we	 could	 argue	 that	parsimony	is	epistemologically	justified.	A	parsimonious	theory	proves	a	greater	understanding	of	the	target	phenomenon	compared	to	an	alternative	equally	explanatory	but	less	parsimonious	theory.	Second,	we	might	 think	 that	nature	 itself	 is	parsimonious.	Following	Newton,	we	could	think	that:	We	are	to	admit	no	more	causes	of	natural	things	than	such	as	are	both	true	and	sufficient	to	explain	their	appearances.	To	this	purpose	the	philosophers	say	that	Nature	does	nothing	in	vain,	and	more	is	in	vain	when	less	will	serve;	for	Nature	is	pleased	with	simplicity,	and	affects	not	the	pomp	of	superfluous	causes	(Newton,	1846:	Book	3;	p.	384).	We	might	reject	either	or	both	of	these	claims,	but	that	we	can	reject	parsimony	tells	us	nothing	about	whether	it	is	a	primitive	or	not.	So,	why	should	we	think	of	parsimony	as	a	primitive?	To	see	this,	consider	the	discussion	of	theoretical	virtues	in	Nolan	(2015).	Nolan	considers	how	we	might	 justify	 theoretical	 virtues.	 One	 method	 is	 to	 support	 one	 theoretical	 virtue	 through	 a	further	virtue	 (or	virtues).	 For	example,	parsimony	might	be	a	valuable	 theoretical	 virtue	as	 it	leads	to	simplicity,	which	is	itself	a	theoretical	virtue.	The	problem	is	that	we	now	need	to	justify	simplicity.	 Nolan	 concludes	 his	 assessment	 of	 this	 method	 of	 justifying	 theoretical	 virtues	 by	saying	that:	such	 justifications	 of	 theoretical	 virtues	 tend	 to	 bring	 the	 problem	 of	justifying	 the	 other	 virtues	 into	 sharp	 focus;	 but	 to	 some	 extent	 this	 sort	 of	bump-shifting	 is	 unavoidable	 unless	 there	 is	 a	 way	 to	 justify	 a	 method	without	using	any	method.	And	there	isn’t.	(Nolan,	2015:	225)	Our	 initial	 characterisation	 of	 a	 primitive	 was	 that	 a	 term	 is	 primitive	 within	 a	 theory	 when,	relative	to	that	theory,	that	term	is	not	defined	except	in	a	circular	way.	The	‘bump-shifting’	that	Nolan	 mentions	 suggests	 that	 theoretical	 virtues	 are	 primitive-like.	 On	 this	 first	 method,	 we	cannot	 justify	 parsimony	without	 appealing	 to	 other	 theoretical	 virtues,	which	 in	 turn,	will	 be	justified	through	other	theoretical	virtues,	including	parsimony.	The	justification	is	circular,	and	so	we	are	ultimately	forced	to	accept	them	as	primitives	within	our	theory.	The	second	method	of	justification	for	theoretical	virtues	that	Nolan	discusses	is	to:	look	 at	 past	 successes	 in	 inquiry	 and	 diagnose	 what	 was	 good	 about	 the	method	 that	 yielded	 those	 successes.	 If	 simplicity	 was	 crucial	 to	 Einstein’s	breakthroughs	 about	 relativity,	 or	 to	 the	 Copernican/Galilean/Newtonian	revolution	 in	 cosmology,	 for	 example,	 then	 that	 may	 provide	 us	 with	 good	reason	 to	 think	 that	 simplicity,	 of	 the	 relevant	 sort,	 is	 a	 theoretical	 virtue																																																									10		 See	inter	alia	Baker	(2003,	2016),	Brenner	(2017),	Derkse	(1992),	Forster	and	Sober	(1994),	and	Sober	(1981,	2015)	for	various	discussions	of	parsimony	and	simplicity,	both	applied	to	particular	cases	and	in	general.	
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(Nolan,	2015:	225).	The	view	 is	 that	 the	 theoretical	virtue	as	 it	 is	applied	shows	us	 that	 it	 is	valuable.	However,	as	Nolan	points	out,	how	do	we	evaluate	‘success’?	We	cannot	simply	assign	favour	to	those	theories	that	already	display	 those	 theoretical	virtues	 that	we	are	 interested	 in.	 If	 ‘success’	 is	 shown	by	theories	 having	 explanatory	 power	 whilst	 being	 parsimonious,	 then	 we	 have	 not	 justified	parsimony	 in	 looking	 at	 the	 success	 of	 those	 theories.	 We	 cannot	 justify	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	theoretical	 virtue	on	 the	grounds	 that	 it	 brought	 success	 if	 those	 successes	 are	 at	 least	 in	part	taken	to	be	successes	in	virtue	of	them	exemplifying	that	virtue.			As	Nolan	comments,	 this	problem	whilst	not	negligible,	 is	also	not	 insurmountable.	Sometimes,	we	do	discover	what	characteristics	our	inquiry	should	have	by	seeing	what	has	worked	before.	However,	 this	 again	 illustrates	 the	 primitive-like	 nature	 of	 theoretical	 virtues.	Much	 like	 other	examples	of	primitives,	we	cannot	endorse	a	theoretical	virtue	except	by	showing	how	that	virtue	helps	us	to	explain	what	we	are	trying	to	explain.	This	is	the	same	as	the	positing	of	ontological	primitives	 and	 then	 showing	 that	 through	 positing	 that	 primitive	 we	 can	 explain	 the	phenomenon	we	want	to	explain.11	It	seems	reasonable	therefore	to	think	that	theoretical	virtues	play	a	primitive-like	role	within	our	theories.	Parsimony,	 and	other	 theoretical	 virtues	potentially,	 therefore	 seem	 to	be	primitive-like.	What	about	 the	 ontological/ideological	 distinction?	 Theoretical	 virtues	 are	 clearly	 not	 ontological.	Even	if	reality	is	best	thought	of	as	parsimonious,	this	is	not	because	reality	contains	some	entity	that	 is	 ‘parsimony’.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	we	should	not	 reify	parsimony,	nor	posit	 it	 as	a	property	of	
entities.	If	parsimony	is	a	property	at	all,	then	it	is	a	property	of	theories,	not	things.		Perhaps	we	should	therefore	think	of	theoretical	virtues	as	further	bits	of	ideology.	If	this	is	the	case,	then	theoretical	virtues	might	be	a	particular	example	of	some	kind	of	primitive	discussed	earlier.	However,	 if	we	 take	 theoretical	 virtues	 to	 be	parts	 of	 our	 ideology,	 and,	 as	 argued,	we	take	them	to	be	primitive	because	they	resist	further	analysis,	then	we	must	recognise	that	these	theoretical	 virtue	 ideological	 primitives	 play	 a	 very	 different	 role	 than	 other	 ideological	primitives.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 normal	 role	 for	 theoretical	 virtues	 is	 to	 allow	 us	 to	 compare	competing	 theories.	 This	 means	 that	 theoretical	 virtues,	 unlike	 other	 posited	 ideological	primitives,	are	 ‘inter-theoretic’	–	 they	are	not	part	of	any	single	 theory,	but	are,	at	best,	part	of	some	more	(perhaps	maximal)	general	methodological	theory.12	There	 is,	 however,	 a	 further	 issue	 for	 those	 who	 take	 theoretical	 virtues	 to	 be	 instances	 of	ideology.	 Ideology	 is	 sometimes	 taken	 to	 be	 ‘external’	 or	 ‘in	 the	 world’.	 I	 have	 in	 mind	 here	people	like	Sider	(2011)	who	argues	that	the	existential	quantifier	carves	reality	at	its	joints.	This	therefore	is	a	piece	of	ideology	that	is	non-formal	in	some	sense.	It	is	‘in’	the	world	even	if	it	does	not	exist;	it	is	ontic,	yet	it	is	a	bit	of	ideology.																																																										11		 Sider	similarly	suggests	that	the	choice	of	primitive	can	be	justified	if	that	choice	leads	to	an	explanatory	and	predictively	successful	theory	(see	Sider	2011:	14-16,	51,	114).	12		 I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	on	this	point.		
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If	we	accept	that	ideology	can	be	like	this,	then	we	should	resist	the	idea	that	theoretical	virtues	are	ideology.	Theoretical	virtues	are	unavoidably	formal.	They	are	epistemological	limits	on	our	theories	and	should	never	be	taken	to	be	ontic	even	if	we	believe	that	reality	conforms	to	them	–	or	 perhaps	 more	 accurately	 that	 a	 theory	 that	 abides	 by	 such	 theoretical	 virtues	 accurately	describes	the	world	or	the	phenomenon	in	question.	Even	if	we	believe	that	reality	contains	very	few	posits	that	does	not	mean	that	reality	is	parsimonious.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	parsimony	(and	 other	 theoretical	 virtues)	 are	 comparative.	 We	 can	 only	 make	 sense	 of	 a	 theory	 being	parsimonious	in	relation	to	a	less	parsimonious	theory.	If	we	accept,	as	most	do,	that	there	is	only	one	reality	(irrespective	of	how	many	ways	to	describe	reality	there	are),	then	reality	cannot	be	compared	 to	 some	 further	 reality	 to	 see	which	 is	more	 parsimonious.	 There	 is	 no	 alternative	reality	to	compare	reality	to	in	order	to	see	how	parsimonious	it	is.13		These	 issues	 point	 against	 simply	 taking	 theoretical	 virtues	 as	 being	 part	 of	 our	 ideology,	 and	instead,	I	argue,	suggest	rather	that	theoretical	virtues	are	some	alternative	type	of	primitive	that	does	not	fit	into	the	four-way	distinction	outlined	above.	Thus,	my	proposal	is	to	take	theoretical	virtues	 to	 be	 meta-theoretical	 ideological	 primitives.	 This	 would	 distinguish	 them	 from	 the	ideological	 primitives	 within	 first-order	 theories,	 but	 would	 maintain	 the	 importance	 of	theoretical	virtues	in	our	theory-choice,	and	their	theory-shaping	role,	without	being	part	of	the	theories	 that	 they	shape.	Theoretical	virtues	as	meta-theoretical	 ideological	primitives	explains	how	theoretical	virtues	are	able	to	perform	their	role	as	criteria	by	which	we	can	compare	first-order	 theories,	 without	 forcing	 us	 to	 admit	 of	 any	 primitive	 that	 is	 neither	 ontological	 or	ideological.		However,	 either	 way	 –	 whether	 we	 resist	 the	 above	 points	 and	 take	 them	 to	 be	 first-order	ideological	 posits,	 or	meta-theoretical	 ideological	 posits	 –	 that	 theoretical	 virtues	 are	primitive	bits	of	ideology	needs	to	be	explicitly	recognised.	The	choice	of	which	theoretical	virtue(s)	guide	us	can	(at	least)	be	as	important	as	positing	a	primitive	resemblance	relation,	or	a	primitive	kind	of	entity.	Theoretical	virtues	play	just	as	strong	a	structuring	role	within	our	theories	and	dictate	constraints	 on	 that	 theory	 in	 the	 same	way	 as	more	 explicitly	 acknowledged	 primitive	 posits.	However,	 theoretical	 virtues	 are	 not	 often	 discussed	 as	 important	 primitive	 ideological	commitments	 in	 the	way	 that,	 say,	 the	 exact	 resemblance	 relation	 is	 debated	 as	 an	 ideological	primitive	 in	 the	 bundle-trope	 theory	 of	 attribute	 agreement.	 Theories	 are	 expected	 to	 defend	their	 positing	 of	 standard	 ideological	 or	 ontological	 primitives,	 but	 are	 rarely	 asked	 to	 defend	their	appeal	to	a	particular	theoretical	virtue,	despite,	as	we	have	noted	with	parsimony,	the	lack	of	clarity	about	those	theoretical	virtues.		
5.	Primitive	Choice	I	 have	 outlined	 a	 number	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 primitives.	 What	 then	 are	 the	 prospects	 for	comparing	primitives?	Are	all	primitives	created	equal?	First,	the	above	distinctions	have	shown	that	there	are	a	number	of	different	kinds	of	primitives,	but	that	there	appears	to	be	no	definite																																																									13		 This	is	even	the	case	for	Lewis’	modal	realism	as	reality	for	Lewis	is	the	total	of	all	possible	worlds.	
	 14	
hierarchy	of	 ‘better’	or	 ‘worse’	primitive	posits.	Despite	all	 this,	 it	 is	not	 the	case	 that	anything	goes.	We	still	need	to	be	able	to	adjudicate	between	different	sets	of	primitives.	I	cannot	offer	any	fully	detailed	methodology	here,	but	I	offer	some	(hopefully	illuminating)	thoughts.	Thankfully,	we	need	not	compare	sets	of	primitives	 in	 isolation.	We	can	compare	primitives	by	looking	 at	 the	 consequences	 that	 a	 set	 of	 primitives	 entails.	 Take	 a	 theory,	 T.	 T	 posits	 a	 set	 of	(ontological	 and/or	 ideological)	 primitives	 P.	 From	 P	 we	 should	 be	 able	 to	 derive	 the	commitments	of	T.	From	P,	we	should	be	able	to	understand	how	T	would	provide	solutions	to	the	 kinds	 of	 problems	 that	 we	 take	 to	 be	 important	 for	 theories	 in	 the	 domain	 to	 provide	solutions	to.	The	value	of	the	primitives	can,	and	should,	be	assessed	with	respect	to	the	widest	scope	of	the	theory	in	question.	The	set	of	primitives	P	can	in	this	way	be	compared	to	the	set	of	primitives	P*	within	theory	T*	by	seeing	how	well	T	and	T*	provide	the	wanted	solutions	to	the	relevant	questions	and	puzzles.	This	suggests	that	the	best	way	to	compare	primitives	is	to	look	at	those	primitives	relative	to	the	
whole	 theory	 within	 which	 they	 are	 posited,	 thus	 requiring	 a	 global	 understanding	 and	appreciation	in	our	theory	construction.	Put	another	way,	this	 indicates	an	explicit	need	for	so-called	‘system-building’.	Once	we	have	rejected	those	theories	built	upon	sets	of	primitives	that	are	either	at	first	glance,	or	through	more	detailed	analysis,	 inconsistent,	then	we	would	be	left	with	a	 clearer	 range	of	 consistent	whole-theory	options.	Further	 conceptual	or	empirical	work	may	strike	out	what	previously	seemed	to	be	a	possible	theory.	It	may	be	that	we	will	ultimately	be	able	to	through	further	analysis	realise	that	only	one	option	remains	open	to	us,	though	this	is	not	obviously	the	case.	How	we	decide	between	those	remaining	options	 is	a	difficult	question,	and	may	change	from	domain	to	domain,	but	we	can	only	compare	sets	of	primitives	fully	if	we	know	 the	 comparison	 class	 against	 which	 to	 compare	 them,	 and	 that	 requires	 a	 global	perspective	on	a	theory	and	its	benefits.14	To	see	this	in	action,	and	going	back	to	a	previous	example,	grounding	theorists	seek	to	eliminate	many	 of	 the	 relations	 that	 other	 metaphysicians	 have	 posited	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 single	 ‘Big-G	Grounding’	 relation.	 This,	 I’ve	 argued,	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 focus	 on	 a	 specific	primitive	 relation	 and	 consider	 whether	 this	 single	 primitive	 relation	 can	 explain	 what	 was	previous	explained	through	a	set	of	primitive	(or	a	set	of	primitive	and	non-primitive)	relations.	The	methodology	 of	 grounding	 theorists	 seems	 to	 have	 often	 (even	 if	 not	 by	 design)	 been	 to	explain	on	a	case-by-case	basis	how	grounding	can	explain	various	phenomena.15	One	example	of	grounding	 would	 not,	 by	 itself,	 be	 persuasive	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 the	 various	metaphysical	relations	can	be	replaced	with	a	single	unitary	notion	of	grounding.	I	wish	to	remain	neutral	here	as	to	whether	this	metaphysical	account	is	correct.	My	point	is	that	the	theory,	and	grounding	as	a	primitive	posit,	only	becomes	persuasive	if	we	consider	the	view																																																									14		 For	 a	 version	 of	 this	 view	within	 the	 domain	 of	metaphysics	 see	 Lowe	 (1998:	 chapter	 1;	 2011),	 and	Miller	(forthcoming).	15		 See	 references	 in	 footnote	 6.	 Whilst	 these	 applications	 overlap,	 they	 are	 independent	 discussions	 of	grounding,	relative	to	the	specific	aims	listed.	
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in	 a	 global	 way.	 The	 defence	 of	 grounding	 has	 been	 local	 with	 each	 new	 example	 taken	 up	individually,	 but	 grounding	 as	 an	 overarching	 claim	 is	 only	 persuasive	 if	 multiple	 previously	posited	 (primitive)	 relations	 can	 be	 subsumed	 under	 it.	 The	 way	 to	 compare	 the	 grounding	account	 to	 its	 competitors	 is	 to	 compare	 the	 primitive(s)	 invoked	 relative	 to	 the	 wider	metaphysics	that	they	are	within.	Second,	we	must	be	open	about	both	what	our	primitives	are,	and	what	kinds	of	primitives	they	are.	 Whilst	 there	 may	 not	 be	 anything	 inherently	 better	 or	 worse	 between,	 say,	 positing	ontological	 rather	 than	 ideological	 primitives,	 that	we	 have	 posited	 ontological	 primitives	will	mean	that	that	theory	is	importantly	different	from	one	that	favours	ideological	primitives.	It	is	through	explicit	discussion	of	the	primitives	we	are	positing	within	our	theory	that	we	are	able	to	then	compare	them.	Only	then	can	we	begin	to	see	which	theories	favour	ideology	over	ontology,	or	kind	parsimony	over	number	parsimony,	or	are	ultimately	driven	by	a	commitment	to	certain	theoretical	virtues.	Whether	or	not	we	find	the	theories	persuasive	will	at	least	partially	depend	on	these	issues.	
6.	Conclusion	The	 aims	 of	 this	 paper	 have	 been	 both	 diagnostic	 and	 prescriptive.	 I	 have	 characterised	what	primitives	are,	and	made	some	key	distinctions	between	types	of	primitives.	I	have	also	argued	that	 there	are	 some	primitives	–	most	 centrally	 theoretical	 virtues	–	 that	 are	primitives	 in	our	theories,	but	do	not	often	get	explicitly	treated	as	such.		I	am	not	arguing	that	we	should	avoid	appealing	to	primitives,	or	to	primitive	theoretical	virtues.	Quite	the	opposite	–	I	have	claimed	that	we	cannot	hope	to	avoid	primitives,	but	that	we	should	be	open	and	honest	about	what	primitives	we	are	invoking.	Primitives	shape	a	theory	from	the	ground	up.	Which	ones	we	adopt	is	a	crucial	part	of	a	theory.	We	should	not	be	worried	by	this.	An	appeal	to	a	primitive	is	not	a	sign	that	the	theory	has	failed.	Rather,	identifying	the	primitives	of	a	theory	allows	us	to	better	understand	how	the	elements	of	that	theory	tie	together.	Seeing	how	positing	certain	types	of	primitives	will	affect	the	resultant	theory	is	one	of	the	best	ways	to	explore	what	theoretical	or	conceptual	space	is	open	to	us.	Primitives	cannot,	and	should	not,	be	eliminated	from	our	theories,	but	we	should	learn	to	recognise	the	different	kinds	of	primitives	and	embrace	them	more	openly.	
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